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DOES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT PROVIDE A
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR A FEDERAL BAN ON
CLONING?
Sean Charles Vinck*
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, human cloning has become the subject of intense public
debate because the possibility of cloned human persons raises grave ethical qualms. For
many, the practice of cloning "violates a fundamental principle of human rights-to
treat human beings as ends and not as means."' Human cloning presents unique ethical
and legal quandaries, in part, because the "utilitarian considerations that are appropriate
for [cloning] plants and animals ... cannot ethically be extended to humans."2 Human
cloning thus fails moral scrutiny because "to use human beings and to maximize bene-
fits through performing experiments on them" is morally objectionable.
The importance of the ethical questions involved in the debate over human cloning
has justifiably provoked the interest of Congress. In light of these ethical and legal con-
siderations, political will in Congress has arisen for the enactment of a statute outlawing
human cloning. However, in order for Congress to enact a valid statute to ban the prac-
tice of cloning, the Federal Constitution must provide a font of authority for such a law
because "an act of Congress is invalid unless it is affirmatively authorized under the
Constitution.",4 Article 1, § I endows Congress "not with all 'legislative power'," ' but
only with the powers the Constitution specifically enumerates.
A review of the Court's "new federalism" jurisprudence reveals that the commerce
clause would not suffice as a jurisdictional basis for a ban on human cloning. Conse-
quently, Congress must focus its attention on alternative sources of authority. Because
of cloning's potential to impose "badges and incidents" of slavery on cloned persons,
the Thirteenth Amendment is a plausible source of authority for a ban on human clon-
ing.6
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II. THE COMMERCE POWER IS AN INSUFFICIENT JURISDICTIONAL PREDICATE FOR A
HUMAN CLONING BAN
Without a credible jurisdictional basis for a ban on cloning, the statute would fail to
pass judicial and legislative scrutiny. While many might believe that the commerce
clause is a sufficient jurisdictional basis for the enactment of a cloning ban,7 the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez8 and United States v. Morrison9 has
limited Congress's scope of regulatory authority pursuant to its commerce power. In
Lopez, the Court recognized that Congress may only regulate three broad areas under the
commerce clause:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second,
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate com-
merce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.l°
A ban on human cloning could not fall under the rubric of a regulation of the chan-
nels of interstate commerce. If anything, the materials necessary for cloning or the
cloned human itself may constitute objects in the flow of interstate commerce. As such,
Congress, conceivably, could regulate the interstate transport of the technological mate-
rial necessary to perform cloning. However, crafting a statute that would identify exclu-
sively and precisely the materials necessary for cloning would be difficult without inhib-
iting the transport of technology that has alternative, legitimate purposes. Furthermore,
this would be a cumbersome method of regulating the activity in question; one could
perform cloning in a purely intrastate fashion and locate him or herself beyond the legis-
lative reach of Congress.
Most likely, for Congress to regulate cloning under the commerce power, Congress
would have to articulate as jurisdictional justification the belief that human cloning ex-
ercises a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the third prong of the Lopez test.
Morrison propounded a set of criteria for identifying activities exerting a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. In Morrison, the Court stated:
Reviewing our case law, we noted that 'we have upheld a wide variety of congres-
sional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the
activity substantially affected interstate commerce .... [W]e stated that the pattern of
analysis is clear. . . . '[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate com-
merce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.' I
teenth Amendment's proscription of slavery since patenting an embryo confers a property right on a human
being).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
I1. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-560).
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It is certainly not clear that a law regulating the practice of human cloning could
fairly be categorized as a regulation of economic activity. If Congress were to craft a
law specifically to regulate the sale of cloned persons or the body parts of cloned per-
sons, such a prohibition would almost certainly pass constitutional muster as a legiti-
mate economic regulation. Yet, a statute regulating the transport of clones or their body
parts would amount to a blunt or indirect means of regulating the practice of cloning,
which is the legitimate object of the regulation. What is objectionable is not only the
trade of cloned persons, but the actual process of cloning. Thus, the practice of cloning
should be the primary object of regulation. Unfortunately, a statute simply attacking the
practice of cloning would not meet the first of Morrison's criteria, since the practice of
cloning is not economic in nature. The Court pointed out that it has never sustained the
regulation of non-commercial intrastate activity predicated on the "substantial effects"
prong: "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases
where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activ-
ity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some
sort of economic endeavor."' 12 This statement is a strong barrier to effective federal regu-
lation of cloning pursuant to the commerce power.
Morrison's second factor considers whether a statute contains an "express jurisdic-
tional element which might limit its reach to [activities having] ... an explicit connec-
tion with or effect on interstate commerce."' 3 Certainly, Congress could attach to the
statute a jurisdictional provision limiting the effect of the proscription of cloning to enti-
ties engaged in interstate commerce. Yet, this factor alone would not be dispositive. The
Court, in Morrison, held only that such a jurisdictional element "may establish that the
enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce."
'14
Finally, the Court has indicated that "formal findings" as to the effect that the regu-
lated activity exerts on interstate commerce may "enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye."' 5 Undoubtedly, Congress
could make a tenuous argument that the practice of cloning could affect interstate com-
merce by creating a market for the body parts of cloned human persons. However, the
forging of such a link would be mostly conjectural. Moreover, it is questionable whether
there would be a market for cloned humans or their body parts large enough to rise to
the level of "substantial" that the Lopez test demands for a statute to pass Commerce
Clause scrutiny. Thus, it is unlikely that Congress could legitimately use its commerce
power to enact a human cloning ban.
III. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A JURISDICTIONAL PREDICATE
Since the Commerce Clause is unlikely to offer a sufficient jurisdictional basis for a
federal cloning ban, it is necessary to look to other sources of congressional authority in
the Federal Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment is a particularly promising source
of such authority. The Amendment comprises two sections. The first, of course, prohib-
12. Id. at 611.
13. id. at 61 -12 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
14. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
15. Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563).
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its slavery and involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime. Critically for the
purpose of regulating cloning is its second section, which states that "Congress shall
have power to enforce this article [a prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude] by
appropriate legislation."'' 6 The Supreme Court has dealt with congressional legislation
predicated on the enabling clause of the Thirteenth Amendment in several cases. In
United States v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that:
it is clear that this amendment [Thirteenth Amendment], besides abolishing forever
slavery and involuntary servitude within the United States, gives power to Congress
to protect all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States from being in any
way subjected to slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime,
and in the enjoyment of that freedom which it was the object of the amendment to se-
17cure.
In other cases, the Court has expanded further upon the definition of those practices
which the Thirteenth Amendment's Enabling Clause permits Congress to proscribe. In
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court held that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment clothed "'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolish-
ing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.""' 8 Justice Stewart's major-
ity opinion stated further that "surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and
the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation."' 9 The Court ar-
ticulated a broad understanding of badges and incidents of slavery, which include "re-
straints upon 'those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, [exam-
ples of which include the right] ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, and convey property
-,20
IV. CLONING'S IMPOSITION OF "GENETIC BONDAGE" IS A BADGE OR INCIDENT OF
SLAVERY
In order for Congress to regulate cloning under the Enabling Clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, the drafters of the legislation must maintain that the practice of hu-
man cloning will impose on the cloned individual "badges and incidents" of slavery.
Courts should afford deference to Congress's judgment as to what constitutes a badge or
incident of slavery.2' While some may perceive benefits to the science of cloning,
namely, "[piroviding children to infertile couples, making available to families a genetic
duplicate of a prematurely deceased child, a relative, or an admired person, and control-
ling the sex of children to accommodate parental desires for a 'balanced' family or to
,,22
evade ... risk of any of some 50 sex-linked genetic diseases, the manifest ethical and
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
17. 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (citing United States v. Rhodes, I Abb. (U.S.) 28 (1866)).
18. 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1882)).
19. Id. at 440.
20. Id. at 44 1.
21. Id. at 443.
22. Francis C. Pizzulli, Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional Assess-
ment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476,490-91 (1974).
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legal problems with cloning are severe enough to plausibly implicate the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Upon entry into the world, a cloned human person becomes the victim of "genetic
bondage. 23 Since a cloned individual does not have a unique genetic makeup, his or her
sphere of freedom is limited; unfettered cloning's inevitable result "is the diminution of
,,24internal autonomy. Genetic bondage amounts to a badge or incident of slavery be-
cause it impinges "upon 'those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil free-
dom.' 25 The Thirteenth Amendment is a plausible jurisdictional predicate since "it is a
constitutional repository of our notions of free will and personal autonomy by virtue of
its guarantee against the imposition of all 'badges of slavery,' whether occasioned by
private or state action. 26
Francis Pizzuli's article on cloning technology makes a strong case for the notion
that cloning amounts to genetic bondage. He identifies four principles that support the
notion that cloned humans are the victims of genetic bondage. First, he argues that "the
rendering of human constitution and behavior to a degree of predictability is incompati-
ble with a widely held theory of free will."'27 This argument echoes the liberty jurispru-
dence the Supreme Court articulated in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Ca-
sey, in which the majority opinion pronounced that "at the heart of liberty is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State. 28 What cloning attempts, as Pizulli
writes, is to predetermine the constitution and disposition of a human person by insisting
on a predetermined genetic makeup, the necessary and unavoidable result of asexual
reproduction. As such, the cloned individual suffers a loss of the liberty to define his or
her own concept of "existence." A federal ban on cloning, under the rubric of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, would go some length in promoting the Court's stated desire to
protect individual liberty, an interest articulated eloquently by the Casey plurality and
reiterated recently in Lawrence v. Texas.29 Thus one compelling reason for Congress to
enact a human cloning ban is the fact that the purposeful generation of offspring asexu-
ally with the aim of predetermining their behavioral traits is incompatible with values
that the Supreme Court has held to be implicit in the text of the Constitution.
That "the recognition of this incompatibility [between predetermined genetic
makeup and free will] will cause an impairment of internal autonomy, or the capacity
for feeling free" is another reason for enacting a human cloning ban. 30 The dearth of
spontaneity in the person's development, particularly if the cloned individual is aware of
his or her true origin, will exert a negative impact on his or her ability to forge a unique,
fully free identity or existence. Again, the negative impact on "internal autonomy" Pizz-
23. Id. at 517.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 16; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 (1882).
26. Pizzulli, supra note 22, at 517.
27. See id. at 517-18.
28. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
29. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481(2003) ("In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, the Court reaf-
firmed the substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. The Casey decision again
confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.").
30. Pizzulli, supra note 22, at 517 (citing Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969)).
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ulli laments seems to speak to the same concerns to which the Casey plurality spoke in
articulating the philosophical bases of Constitutionally protected liberties. Indeed, there
is a plausible case that the Supreme Court should interpret the Thirteenth Amendment in
such a way as to protect citizens' internal autonomy just as much as it protects the popu-
lace from strictures imposing constraint on external autonomy. 31 Newer interpretations
of the Thirteenth Amendment "recognize that man's freedom may be limited by either
external or internal barriers to achievement."
32
Another argument for a human cloning ban is that "an impact on internal autonomy
will have a direct and proportionate impact on external autonomy and the exercise of
one's civil liberties."33 This is plausible, since a clone's knowledge of his genetic past
would lead him or her to a sense of entrapment. This internal barrier would eventually
become an external hindrance; the sense of powerlessness would deter a cloned person
from taking advantage of the full scope of social, economic, and political privileges of a
free society. In sum, the awareness that parents or physicians had imposed a predeter-
mined genetic identity on the clone would result "in the diminution of one's [the cloned
person's] external autonomy, [raising] an issue of 'badges of slavery' under the Thir-
teenth amendment."
34
Congress should not be dissuaded from accepting that predetermined genetic iden-
tity constitutes a badge or incident of slavery out of a belief that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment protects only African Americans or a specific racial group. On the contrary, the
Thirteenth Amendment "is the denunciation of a condition and not a declaration in favor
of a particular people. It reaches every race and every individual, and if in any respect it
commits one race to the nation it commits every race and every individual thereof.,
35
Numerous other factors militate in favor of a finding that cloning imposes a badge
or incident of slavery onto the cloned person. All that is required for a cloning ban to
pass constitutional muster with respect to the question of whether the Thirteenth
Amendment is a legitimate jurisdictional predicate is a Congressional finding that fed-
eral legislation is "'rationally' capable of classification as a 'badge' or 'incident' of
slavery." 36 The cloned person suffers not only "loss of genetic distinctiveness like the
identical twin," but also "is ... saddled with a genotype that has already lived. 37 Fur-
thermore, "it is altogether likely that the ... parents will desire to manipulate and con-
trol the environment as well as the genotype in an attempt to reproduce the person who
was copied., 38 Additionally,
[a] clonant's future could not be charted out by his parents with inexorable determin-
ism, but there would be sufficient psychological damage by having him [the cloned
person], along with his parents believing otherwise. Forcing him into a lifestyle he
31. See id. at 518.
32. Id. (citing Note, The "New'" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1294,
1307(1969)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. I, 16-17 (1906).
36. Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42 ARIz. L. REV. 647,667
(2000) (citation omitted).
37. Pizzulli, supra note 22 at 509 (citation omitted).
38. Id.
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might neither fit nor want would most likely distort his outlook and stunt his poten-
tial.39
The imposition of a predetermined genetic makeup is a restraint on the fundamental
rights of personhood and citizenship. All persons, regardless of race or ethnicity, possess
a unique genotype and have the potential for unique development. Given the diverse
genetic makeup of persons produced from sexual intercourse, the sexually reproduced
child would not suffer under the weight of expectation of genetic similarity that a cloned
child would. Each person's uniqueness is as fundamental a liberty as the political and
economic freedoms the Court mentioned in Civil Rights Cases.40 Because the unique-
ness of which the cloned person is deprived is irreplaceable and life-long, a rational
Congress could term reproduction from cloning a "badge or incident" of slavery. 4 ,
Other scholars have endorsed the notion that cloning imposes the badge or incident
of slavery on a person born through asexual reproduction. One argues that "because
cloning would create a later-born genetic twin, the resulting child's 'autonomy might be
limited [because] his or her genetic traits and predispositions are already known.' 42 In
addition, "[t]he person created by cloning ... may lack the same free will as a person
created by sexual procreation. ' 43 Cloning's potential to diminish free will and human
dignity persuades others that human cloning would subject a clonant to forbidden subju-
gation. One scholar argues that "[b]oth human cloning and genetic manipulation raise
fears of the creation of a master and/or subjugated population." 44 Furthermore, "human
cloning ... thus may run afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment because ... creating hu-
mans with a predetermined genetic makeup, laden with expectation, thereby limit[s] a
cloned individual's freedom. '45 Many experts agree that predetermined genetic makeup
will exert a negative impact on the freedom of the clonant. It is plausible that the impact
will be severe enough to qualify as a badge of slavery.
V. ROE DOES NOT MANDATE A RIGHT TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM BROAD ENOUGH TO
ENCOMPASS HUMAN CLONING
One possible objection to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment as a jurisdictional
predicate for a ban on cloning would be the fact that the Supreme Court has determined
that women have a broad Constitutional liberty to reproductive freedom.46 In Roe, the
Court held that the Due Process Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secured a
right for women to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.47 Presumably, one could
39. Id.
40. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41. Foley, supra note 36 at 667.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 666.
44. Barry Brown, Human Cloning and Genetic Engineering: The Case for Proceeding Cautiously, 65
ALB. L. REV. 649,658 (2002).
45. Id.
46. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as
the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
47. 410 U.S. at 153 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regu-
lation.").
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argue that a ban on cloning would undermine the reproductive freedom the Court en-
dorsed in Roe. However, the ruling in Roe would not be controlling in the case of a ban
on human cloning; abortion and cloning are factually and legally distinguishable.
First, the Court would not have to change its jurisprudence to consider cloned fe-
tuses Constitutional persons in order for Congress to outlaw human cloning. A cloning
ban would regulate the practice of cloning before the cloned fetus even came into exis-
tence. Thus, the question of whether the cloned fetus is in fact a person in Constitutional
terms would be irrelevant. In addition, Roe limited its holding to abortion and did not
extend explicitly or implicitly to a woman's decision to engage in alternative means of
asexual reproduction. Furthermore, even the right recognized in Roe is not absolute.48
States may not proscribe abortion, at least in the pre-viability stage of pregnancy,
because the Court has determined that a woman's right, grounded in personal privacy, to
terminate her pregnancy, outweighs the right of a fetus to live.49 But in the case of clon-
ing, the rights-balancing calculus would be fundamentally different. For example, it may
fairly be said that one reason for giving such weight to a woman's personal privacy
liberty in the situation of abortion is that the woman is seeking to terminate a pregnancy.
In other words, a woman's right to personal liberty in the reproductive sphere becomes
the focus of Constitutional scrutiny in the case of abortion because she is seeking to stop
the progression of a natural process (pregnancy) whose burdens she alone must bear in
the physical, psychological, and financial sense. In the case of cloning, the same consid-
erations which might induce the Court to place great emphasis on the woman's personal
liberty as in the case of abortion do not exist. The intentions and burdens of the parents
with respect to the reproduction in the case of cloning and in the case of an unwanted
pregnancy which a mother seeks to terminate are fundamentally different. Consequently,
the constitutional liberties of parents in each situation should be different. The reproduc-
tive rights of parents seeking to clone children are also less compelling because the off-
spring they are seeking to bear would be subject to unique suffering. Human cloning is a
process in which prospective parents voluntarily seek to have a child through complex,
extraordinary means. Because parents of cloned children consciously seek the birth of a
child and because they would not be subject to the same burdens of mother seeking an
abortion, human cloning implicates different Constitutional rights. With respect to clon-
ing, the relevant Constitutional questions involve more the legal rights and status of the
cloned individual after birth, not the legal rights and status of its parents prior to birth:
parents of cloned children could not assert the same injuries resulting from carrying a
cloned child as would a mother carrying a child she seeks to abort. Legislation would
ban human cloning on the basis of the potential maladies a cloned individual would
suffer outside of the womb and not on the basis of the maladies its mother would suffer
during pregnancy.
48. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. 833, infra note 49.
49. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (stating that a central
principle of Constitutional abortion jurisprudence "is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have
an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the
State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the various legal complexities that permeate the discussion of a federal
cloning ban, the ethical and moral repercussions of unrestrained human cloning are se-
vere enough to invite proscription by the United States Congress. In crafting a perma-
nent ban, Congress members should employ the Thirteenth Amendment as its jurisdic-
tional predicate. Not only is the Commerce Clause a less than completely satisfactory
jurisdictional predicate, but proscribing cloning in the same fashion as slavery would
have the effect of demonstrating the nation's collective moral revulsion towards cloning
and its dangerous fruits. While it is not certain that a majority of Congress would accept
the notion that cloning amounts to a badge or incident of slavery, it is equally apparent
that the society "may choose not to support a procedure that implicates a genetic form of
slavery, undermines free will, and infringes upon the civil liberties guaranteed under the
constitution., 50 Besides political and ethical concerns, cloning also raises biological and
health issues. While there are "substantial unknowns attendant to the long-range impact
of genetic modification accompanied by cloning," the "increased susceptibility to dis-
ease, increased occurrence of developmental abnormalities, and adverse effect upon
longevity"'', are areas that concern researchers most familiar with the subject. Genera-
tions of humans unnecessarily plagued by these types of recurring health problems fur-
ther speak to cloning's potential to force on human persons slave-like conditions. In
sum, the harm that cloning imposes on cloned individuals make the Thirteenth Amend-
ment a plausible jurisdictional basis for the enactment of a federal ban on cloning.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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